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Gordley: When Paths Diverge: A Response to Albert Alschuler on Oliver Wend

WHEN PATHS DIVERGE: A RESPONSE TO ALBERT
ALSCHULER ON OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
James Gordley*
I
"God forgive me if I'm wrong."
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

Like Albert Alsehuler, I believe that Holmes' positivism was wrong.
I do not see how it helps to look at law as a bad man would, or to think
of it as mere prediction of what courts will do, or to imagine that terms
such as right, duty, fault, and intention have some fundamentally
different meaning for a good man deciding what to do than for a judge
evaluating what someone has done. Alschuler has shown with even more
clarity and force than Lon Fuller and Henry Hart why that sort of
thinking leads nowhere.2 There is a point in any debate when everything
that needs to be said is said. I surely could not convince those who are
not persuaded by Fuller, Hart, or Alschuler.
Like Fuller and Hart, however, Alschuler has described the dark side
of Holmes. It is there, and, I agree, it has tainted intellectual life in this
century for those who care about law. But no cynic is honored purely
for what he denies. Perhaps some people have followed Holmes the way
children might follow a fire truck: to see something bum. But others
saw a positive program for the future that could only be realized by an
emancipation from the immediate past. I would like to examine that
program, which, in broad outline, was a good one. The difficulty was
not the program but finding a place for it in the modem intellectual
world. Holmes himself could not do so. Indeed, the program was
inconsistent with his own view of the relationship of law and morality.
In The Path of the Law, Holmes said he had two objectives. One was
to determine "the limits of the law."3 He claimed to have done so by
showing that law was merely the sort of prediction a bad man might

* Shannon Cecil Turner Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. I would
like to thank Jan Vetter and my wife Barbara for their suggestions.
1. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Diary, Ballr Bluff, in ToucHED wrrH FIRE: CIVIL WAR
LETTERS AND DIARY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 1861-1864, at 28 (Mark D. Howe ed.,
1969) [hereinafter Holmes' Diary].
2. See LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 62-63 (1940) (discussing Holmes
and realism); id. at 106-07, 117-18 (discussing Holmes and positivism); Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARv. L. REV. 929 (1951).
3. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1897).
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make as to what a court might do to him. His second goal was to
describe "the forces that determine its content and its growth."4 To do
so, he outlined a program that is far from cynical, a program by which
law, "one of the vastest products of the human mind," could realize
"what seems to me the ideal of its future." 5
The program was to move by rational enquiry from decided cases
and particular rules to still more general rules, and then to the ends
served by those rules and the reasons why these ends are desirable. By
so doing, one could understand, criticize, and reformulate the rules
themselves. "Jurisprudence," according to Holmes, "is simply law in its
most generalized part. Every effort to reduce a case to a rule is an effort
of jurisprudence." 6 A "great lawyer" will see in a case "the application
of the broadest rules."7 As Robert Gordon observed, Holmes thought
that "the proper role of the jurist, the role that Holmes is himself
performing, is to develop a method to extract from legal materials the
regularity and order that is already present inside them, not to impose,
by a creative act of interpretation, a new order upon them."8
According to Holmes, the jurist does so by looking at the historical
development of rules and asking what ends the rules have served. The
pursuit of these ends is often "inarticulate and unconscious ' and rules
grow up without any "systematic questioning of their grounds." 1 The
jurist must make a "deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those
rules.""1 Sometimes he will find that a rule once served a purpose but
no longer does so,12 or does so imperfectly. 3 Sometimes, he can
identify a purpose it still serves.' 4 As Gordon notes, Holmes uses
history in both of these ways in his book The Common Law. 5 Sometimes "the exposure of a weird antique origin disqualifies a rule from
contemporary use."' 6 Sometimes the "tracing of a rule from its origins
to the present shows the logic, or teleology, of its evolutionary development, the trend-line one can use to argue how [the rule] should be
4. Id. at 464-65.
5. Id. at 473-74.
6. Id. at 474.
7. Id.
8. Robert W. Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFsTRA
L. REV. 719, 726 (1982) (footnote omitted).
9. Holmes, supra note 3, at 466.

10. Id. at 468.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 469.
See id. at 465.
See id. at 469.
See id. at 466-67.
Gordon, supra note 8, at 733.
Id.
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developed in the future."'" As he said in The Path of the Law, one uses
history to "get the dragon out of his cave" and then one can either "kill
him, or... tame him and make him a useful animal."' 8
To the extent the jurist succeeds, "every rule [the law] contains is
referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and...
the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in
words."' 9 Often a rule represents a compromise or "weighing" of the
importance of "competing" ends.2" Then the jurist must determine what
we are giving up and what we get in return.2 1 As Holmes summarized
his program, it is
to follow the existing body of dogma into its highest
generalizations by the help of jurisprudence; next, to
discover from history how it has come to be what it is; and,
finally, so far as you can, to consider the ends which the
several rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those
ends are desired, what is given up to gain them, and
whether they are worth the price.'
In The Path of the Law and in his other writings, he presents this
program as an alternative, on the one hand, to the traditional
particularism of Anglo-American lawyers, and, on the other, to the
conceptualism of continental jurists. He argues, and I think quite rightly,
that his program is better.
Anglo-American lawyers began to escape particularism only in the
century before Holmes was born. Before Blackstone, the common law
was not studied in universities. Lawyers did not think in terms of larger
categories such as contract and tort but in terms of writs and the
particular rules that had grown up around them. As A.W.B. Simpson has
pointed out, there was little literature outside of the reports of decided
cases. 23 The first treatise on the common law of contract was written
in 1796.24 In the 19th century, law schools opened and many more
treatises were written. For some time, however, they looked less like a
modern treatise and more like an assemblage of particular rules.
17. Id. (footnote omitted).
18. Holmes, supra note 3, at 469.
19. Id.

20. Id. at 466-67.
21. Id. at 474.
22. Id. at 476.
23. A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 LAW Q. REV.
247, 250-51 (1975).
24. See generally JOHN J. POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND
AGREEMENTS

(1796).
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Holmes disapproved. "When I began," he said in 1911, "the law
presented itself as a ragbag of details."' He could only "envy the
felicity" of the present generation who could now "see their subject as
a whole" including "its broadest generalizations."26 In The Path of the
Law, he claimed that "[t]he most important improvements of the last
twenty-five years are improvements in theory."'27 But there was still
"too little theory in the law rather than too much."2 He joked about a
Vermont justice of the peace, so lost among particulars that he found in
favor of a man accused of breaking a chum because he had looked
through the statutes and found nothing about chums.29 According to
Holmes, "[t]he same state of mind is shown in all our common digests
and text-books. Applications of rudimentary rules of contract or tort are
tucked away under the heads of Railroads or Telegraphs.... 30
Moreover, these rules were taken for granted without any effort to
discern their purpose. "It is revolting," Holmes said, "to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV."'" His program would change that.
His program was also an alternative to the conceptualism of
continental writers. Before the 19th century, under the influence of
rationalism, the jurists of the natural law school had begun to write as
though law were like mathematics. Starting with axioms about man and
morals, they tried to arrive at rules by formal proofs. An example was
Christian Wolff.32 In Germany, Kant and the jurists of the 19th century
Pandektenschule thought this effort was hopeless. They broke with it in
different ways. Kant asked what law a rational being would freely
choose to obey. He thus arrived at the "categorical imperative": one
must act only by those rules that one could will to be universal law. The
Pandektists, as the leading school of German jurists was called, did not
try to arrive at rules from universal concepts such as rationality or
freedom. They did try to abstract general concepts from the Roman legal
texts then in force in Germany, and to work out their implications.
Despite the differences, the late natural lawyers, Kant, and the
Pandektists had one trait in common. They tried to understand rules in
25. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Introductionto the GeneralSurvey by EuropeanAuthors in the
ContinentalLegal HistoricalSeries, in COLLEcrED LEGAL PAPERS 298, 301 (1920) [hereinafter
Introduction to the General Survey].
26. Id. at 301-02.
27. Holmes, supra note 3, at 477.
28. Id. at 476.
29. Id. at 474-75.
30. Id. at 475.
31. Id. at 469.
32. See CHRISTIAN WOLFF, IUS NATURAE METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM (1764).
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terms of abstract concepts without asking what ends the rules serve. For
example, Wolff proved that a promisee could demand performance of
a promise by defining it in terms of the transfer of a right to require
performance.33 Kant argued that one could not will as a universal law
that promises be broken since they would then be idle words.34 The
Pandektists assumed without argument that contracts were enforceable.
They then defined contract in terms of the manifestation of the will of
the parties, and tried to infer rules of contract law from this definition. All of them reasoned not only from definitions, but from
definitions that ignored the purposes of enforcing a contract.
Holmes again disapproved. In The Path of the Law, he criticized
those who think "that the only force in the development of law is
logic,... that a given system, ours, for instance, can be worked out like
mathematics from some general axioms of conduct."36 He may have
been thinking of the late natural lawyers, Kant, and the Pandektists all
at once. In a later essay on Natural Law he seems to have had them all
in mind.37 He also may have been thinking of his former colleague at
the Harvard Law School, Christopher Columbus Langdell.38 In any
event, as Matthias Reimann has pointed out, he made the kind of
argument his contemporary Rudolph von Jhering was making in

33. See id. §§ 361-363.
34. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 45 (James W.
Ellington trans., 3d ed. 1993).
35. See JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACt DOCRiNE
162-63, 168-70, 190-98, 204, 209-12 (Tony Honor6 & Joseph Raz eds., 1991).
36. Holmes, supra note 3, at 465.
37. See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310 (1920)
[hereinafter NaturalLaw].
38. Nevertheless, I do not think Mathias Reimann is correct that the reason Holmes
attacked the Germans was to attack Langdell covertly. See Mathias W. Reimann, Holmes'r
Common Law and German Legal Science, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.
72, 106 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992). It is true, as Reimann points out, that Holmes thought
that Langdell was also guilty of conceptualism, and that when he wrote The Common Law, he
wanted an appointment at Harvard, and therefore had a reason to avoid a direct attack. But it
does not follow that Holmes' attack on continental writers was a smoke-screen. In his day, the
German Pandektists had developed the most rigorous and systematic approach to law in the
world. As Reimann observes, Holmes learned German in the mid-1870s and read their works
in the original. Il at 80. He went on criticizing them long after he would have lost any fear of
Langdell. As Reimann also notes, many of them were as guilty as Langdell, and, indeed, rather
more guilty, of the conceptualism that Holmes disliked. See id. at 83-84, 109-10. As Reimann
says, the fact that he attacked them without mentioning other Germans who were attacking them
as well-such as the "Germanists" and Jhering-produced a distorted picture of German
scholarship. See id. at 104-06. But that only shows that Holmes had unacknowledged allies, not
a different adversary.
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Germany.39 The ends that the law serves are "the very root and nerve
of the whole proceeding."' Rules rest on a judgment of the "relative
worth and importance" of these ends.41 Such judgments are made
differently in different times and places, 42 and, indeed, often raise
"debatable and... burning questions." 43 One can only make sense of
the law in terms of the purposes it serves.
Holmes' program, then, has two aspects. On the one hand, we need
not "a ragbag of details," 44 but the "highest generalizations, 45 the
"broadest rules," 46 and more theory. On the other, we need careful
attention to the purposes the law serves. In our century, these two
aspects of Holmes' program have seemed antithetical. We contrast the
formalism of Samuel Williston with the anti-formalism of Karl
Llewellyn. We forget that both of them took inspiration from Holmes.
Scholars who study Holmes sometimes try to resolve the tension by
disregarding one aspect of Holmes' program or the other. For Grant
Gilmore, Holmes is simply a conceptualist like Langdell. "[His]
accomplishment was to make Langdellianism intellectually respectable[,] ... to construct a unitary theory which would explain all
conceivable single instances and thus make it unnecessary to look with
any particularity at what was actually going on in the real world."'47 If
so, one wonders, why did Holmes quarrel with Langdell and conceptual
jurisprudence?
Morton Horwitz thinks that Holmes' opinions changed. The Common
Law, written in 1881, was "deeply rooted in formalism."4' The Path of
the Law, written in 1897, was "decisively antiformalist."'49 The Path
meant "the collapse of his search for immanent rationality in customary
law."5 It "proclaimed the death knell of legal doctrine."'" Horwitz
observes that no one has previously noticed this contrast.52 That in

39. See id. at 101-03.
40. Holmes, supra note 3, at 466.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 466-67.
Id. at 468.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 56 (1977).
Morton J. Horwitz, The Place of Justice Holmes in American Legal Thought, in THiE
LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 31, 68 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992).
49. Id.
50. i at 70.
51. Id. at 51.
52. See id. at 32.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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itself is remarkable. Holmes was usually rather good at getting his point
across.
Horwitz relies on the passages in which Holmes explains the
implications of looking at the law in terms of purposes. When we do so,
as Holmes says, history is only a starting point "toward an enlightened
scepticism, that is, towards a deliberate reconsideration of the worth
of... rules." 3 History gets the dragon from his cave, and then we
either "kill him" or "tame him."' 4 Horwitz concludes that "policy-the
analytic-virtually obliterates history.""5 But couldn't not Holmes
simply mean that we can discover the purposes of rules through history,
and, knowing these purposes, we can either discredit a rule or reformulate it so it better serves its purposes? That is how Holmes used history
in The Common Law. Similarly, Holmes points out that once we look
at law in terms of purposes, we must recognize that legal questions
cannot be "settled deductively, or once for all."5 6 Legal solutions often
will be trade-offs, and so we must "set the advantage we gain against
the other advantage we lose."' According to Horwitz, "[t]he main
message of 'The Path of the Law' is that there is no basis in reason for
deciding which of two contradictory legal doctrines is correct."58 But
couldn't he simply mean that in law, unlike mathematics, there is rarely
one right solution and there often are trade-offs? Holmes said that
workers' compensation law reflects "a concealed, half conscious battle
on the question of legislative policy."5 9 According to Horwitz, Holmes
thought "law is merely politics," that "law is merely a 'battleground'
over which social interests clash."' But, again, Holmes didn't say that.
Horwitz's unstated minor premise is that once one understands the
law in terms of purposes, one cannot believe there is "immanent

53. Holmes, supra note 3, at 469.
54. See id.
55. Horwitz, supra note 48, at 68.

56. See Holmes, supra note 3, at 467.
57. Id. at 474.
58. Horwitz, supra note 48, at 67.
59. Holmes, supra note 3, at 474.
60. Horwitz, supra note 48, at 70. Similarly, Holmes said that "for the rational study of
law, the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man
of statistics and the master of economics." Holmes, supra note 3, at 469. For Horwitz, this
remark is the "death knell of legal doctrine." Horwitz, supra note 48, at 51. It doesn't simply
mean that legal doctrine can be better illuminated by statistics and economics than by parsing
the black letters. In The Path of the Law, Holmes distinguished law from morality as he had in
The Common Law. But, according to Horwitz, the meaning "has dramatically changed" because
Holmes mentions that "the logical method" satisfies "a longing for certainty and repose."
Horwitz, supra note 48, at 68 (quoting Holmes, supra note 3, at 466). It is no wonder other
scholars have missed the dramatic change. To see it one has to read so much between the lines.
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rationality" in the case law. One can have no use for legal doctrine. One
will see law as "merely politics," "merely a 'battleground' over which
social interests clash."'" I understand that some people associated with
the Critical Legal Studies movement take that view. But one cannot
assume that Holmes did. To do so, one has to ignore what he said about
the importance of doctrine. In The Path of the Law, as we have seen, he
said that "[e]very effort to reduce a case to a rule is an effort of
jurisprudence,"' 2 and that a "great lawyer" will see in a case "the
application of the broadest rules."6 He urged us to "follow the existing
body of dogma into its highest generalizations by the help of jurisprudence."' He claimed that "[t]he most important improvements of the
last twenty-five years are improvements in theory."6 But there was still
"too little theory in the law rather than too much."' That isn't a death
knell. It is a call to arms. As Thomas Grey recognized, in The Path of
the Law, Holmes restated his commitnient to systematic doctrine in the
strongest terms.67
Grey reconciled this commitment with Holmes' attack on conceptualism and his concern about purposes by saying Holmes wanted doctrine
to be systematized for reasons that are "practical" and "heuristic. '' "S
Robert Gordon accepted this explanation: Holmes wanted system "for
the sake of making the lawyer's task of finding and applying doctrine
easier.' 69 I don't believe it. Holmes said that a "great lawyer" will seek
the "broadest rules."7 To Holmes, greatness could not have meant
devising useful classificatory systems to assist busy practitioners. When,
as a young man, he found the law a "ragbag of details," he feared, not
that time would be wasted, but that law would not be "worthy of the
interest of an intelligent man."' In 1899, he said there was probably
no "more exalted form of life than that of a great abstract thinker" who
works "simply to feed the deepest hunger and to use the greatest gifts
of his soul."'72 He had just finished praising the "generalizing principle"
61. Horwitz, supra note 48, at 70.
62. Holmes, supra note 3, at 474.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 476.
65. Id. at 477.
66. Id. at 476.
67. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 817
(1989).
68. See id. at 823.
69. Robert W. Gordon, Introduction: Holmes's Shadow, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 1, 9 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992).
70. Holmes, supra note 3, at 474.
71. Introduction to the General Survey, supra note 25, at 301.
72. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
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that had produced a law of torts where once there had been only a list
of particular actions and "no one dreamed... that the different cases
of liability were, or ought to be, governed by the same principles
throughout."73 He did suggest another reason the generalizing principle
might prevail: "because of the ease of mind and comfort which it
brings."'74 But he did not mention saving the practitioners' time.
We should recognize that, as Mathias Reimann observed, Holmes
sought "the reformation of the common law through the search for its
' But he also
truly basic principles and their rational arrangement."75
wanted the principles to reflect the ends the law serves, and he wanted
self-conscious reflection on those ends and why they are desired. That
is what he said he wanted.
Nevertheless, it is understandable that so many scholars have had
difficulty taking Holmes at his word. Holmes' program seems to be
radically inconsistent with the features of his thought that Alschuler
' The program is not positivist.
describes as "Holmesian positivism."76
Actually, in basic outline, it is the program of the classical natural
lawyers who wrote in the Aristotelian tradition before the rise of
rationalism. I would like to describe that earlier program and the
assumptions that lay behind it. As we will see, though their program
was like that of Holmes, their underlying assumptions were not. If
Holmes had shared these assumptions, he would have been in close
agreement with Alschuler.
The natural law tradition that I will discuss began with the rebirth of
interest in Aristotle in the late 12th and early 13th centuries and ended
with the rise of rationalism in the 17th and 18th centuries. It could be
illustrated by the work of Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century, Cajetan,
Domenico Soto, or Richard Hooker in the 16th century, or Leonard
Lessius, Hugo Grotius, or Jean Domat in the 17th century. For purposes
of simplicity, and to avoid the problem of modem influences, I will use
Aquinas as a paradigm example.
The hallmark of this pre-rationalist natural law tradition was that,
like Holmes, the natural lawyers thought that law was a systematic body
of principles corresponding to purposes. Each legal institution, like each
organ of a body or each part of a machine, was defined in terms of its

PAPERS 210, 224 (1920) [hereinafter Law in Science and Science in Law].
73. Id. at 223.
74. Id.
75. Reimann, supra note 38, at 111.
76. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes' Path of the Law One
Hundred Years Later,49 FLA. L. REV. 353, 355 (1997).
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purpose. Their accounts of law looked less like mathematics and more
like biology or engineering.'
They had taken this approach from Aristotle. He wanted to analyze
almost everything the way one would a couch, discovering its purpose
or what it does, and the contribution that each of its parts makes to this
purpose.78 In the 13th century, Aquinas began his commentary on
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics by noting that there are two basic types
of order: the order of part to whole, and the order of means to ends. The
second, he said, is based on the first. 9 The parts of the couch such as
the back, arms or legs each have a purpose which itself is a means to
the ultimate end of the couch. That is why they count as parts. Each part
has the structure it does so that, working in harmony with the other
parts, it can serve this ultimate end. One can discover the purpose of
each part and of the couch as a whole by examining how it is built. The
purposes are implicit in the structure.
Like Holmes, then, the writers in the Aristotelian tradition wanted to
understand law in terms of "the ends, which the several rules seek to
accomplish [and] the reasons why these ends are desired."8 Just
because they agreed on this critical point, they would have agreed with
much else that Holmes said because, quite often, Holmes was merely
explaining the consequences of thinking about law in terms of purposes.
They saw these consequences as well as he did.
For example, they would have agreed that the law cannot "be worked
out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct."" As
Aquinas observed, law deals with practical matters that "are individual
and contingent," and "therefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy
that belongs to demonstrative science." 2 They would have agreed that
sometimes, there is no single right legal solution. Given the ends to be
sought, several courses of action can be equally sensible. The lawmaker
simply has to choose. 3 They would have agreed that even a good
solution might not be valid for all times and places. If new circumstanc77. In describing their program, I will be summarizing points made at length in GORDLEY,
supra note 35, at 10-23, 69-111. See also James Gordley, Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS

131 (David Owen

ed., 1995).
78. ARISTOTLE, PARTS OF ANIMALS I.i. 641' (T.E. Page et al. eds. & A.L. Peck trans.,
1938).
79. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS lib. 1, lec.l (C.I.
Litzinger trans., 1964).
80. Holmes, supra note 3, at 476.

81. Id. at 465.
82. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II, Q. 91, a. 3 ad 3 (Thomas Gilby trans.,
1966) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGIAE].
83. See id. I-1I, Q. 95, a. 2.
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es arise, a rule might no longer serve its end. 4 As an example,
Aquinas quoted Augustine: "If a people have a sense of moderation and
responsibility, and are most careful guardians of the commonwealth,
then it is a rightly enacted law for them to appoint their own magistrates
for their public governance." But that law could be changed "if, as time
goes on, they become so corrupt as to sell their votes and entrust the
government to scoundrels and criminals."85
In Germany, after Rudolph von Jhering wrote a book entitled
Purpose in Law, a reader cited to him passages in which Aquinas'
approach resembled his own. Jhering was surprised. Aquinas, he said,
already exactly understood the concrete, social and historical significance of the moral order... I asked myself with
astonishment how it was possible that such truths, after they
had once been formulated, could have so completely fallen
into disregard.... The fundamental ideas with which I
have been so much preoccupied are expressed and formulated by this powerful thinker concisely and with complete
clarity.8 6
We don't know what Holmes' reaction would have been. To agree
with Jhering, he would have had to overcome his conviction that there
was little to be learned from old books. 7 Yet it is not surprising to find
these parallels. They are consequences of seeing the law in terms of
principles that serve ends.
The natural lawyers, however, were considerably clearer than Holmes
or Jhering about the underlying assumptions that made this approach to
law viable. They believed that some purposes were ultimately more
worthwhile than others, and, although human beings could be mistaken,
they had the ability to see which ones were more worthwhile.

84. See id. I-11, Q. 97, a. 1.
85. Id. I-II, Q. 97, a. 1 (quoting AUGUSTINE, DE LIBERO ARBITRIO I.vi.).

86. 2

RUDOLPH VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END

161 (Isaac Husick trans.,

1921).
87. "[Ihe greatest works of intellect soon lose all but their historic significance. The
science of one generation is refuted or out-generalized by the science of the next; the philosophy
of one century is taken up or transcended by the philosophy of a later one.. " Oliver W.
Holmes, Jr., Montesquieu, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 250, 250 (1920). Similarly, when his
friend Canon Sheehan suggested that he read the Tractus de legibus written in 1612 by Francisco
Suarez, he answered: "You will not quite share my point of view, but I regard pretty much
everything, and especially the greatest things, in the way of books, as dead in fifty, nowadays
in twenty years." Letter of July 17, 1909, in HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE 27 (David
H. Burton ed., 1976). I owe the reference to Patrick Brennan.
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According to them, an end is worth pursuing because of the
contribution it makes to an ultimate end that belongs to a person just
because he is a human being." Like the ultimate end of an animal or
a machine, this end is the way a human being lives when all of his parts
are working properly and in harmony with each other. It is a manner of
life in which his human potential is most fully realized. Living this life
constitutes goodness or happiness for a human being. In the Ethics,
Aristotle described the different human virtues, including justice and
prudence, as different powers that enable a person to live this distinctively human life.89 In the Politics, he said that "the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live
happily." 9
A person decides what will contribute to this ultimate end and what
will obstruct it, not by deductive logic, but by a faculty which they
called the virtue of prudence. 9' Through prudence, one decides what
trade-offs to make when all one's ends cannot be achieved. As Aquinas
said, "[A]ny prudent person will accept a small evil in order not to
obstruct a great good."'92 Lawmaking requires "legislative prudence." 93
Despite some musings about the ultimate end of law,94 Holmes did
not share these assumptions. Because the natural lawyers did, they
would have agreed with much of Alschuler's critique of Holmesian
positivism. They would have agreed with him about the relationship of
law and morality. The two are not identical since law does not
command every good act.95 But law should help people toward their
ultimate end of living a truly human life.96
They would have agreed with Alschuler that even good people need
law.97 Aquinas gave two reasons why they did. First, in certain matters,

88. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS I.vii. 1 0 9 7 1 0 9 8 2.
89. See id. at V.vii.
90. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS VII.i 1324".
91. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI.v.; SUMMATHEOLOGIAE, supranote 82, at II-II,
Q. 47, a. 4, obj. 1; Q. 49, a. 8; Q. 51, a. 8,ad. 1.
92. THOMAS AQUINAS, DE VERITATE Q. 5, a. 4, ad 4, in 9 THOMAS AQUINAS, OPERA
OMNIA 5 (P. Fiaccadori ed., 1859).
93. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 82, at I-1, Q. 50, a. 1 ad 3.
94. Holmes at one point suggested that the ultimate end of law might be "the survival of
a certain type of man." Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Holdsworth's EnglishLaw, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 285, 288-89 (1920) [hereinafter Holdworth English Law]. Presumably, he meant that
the law should not only enable such a man to survive, but to flourish. Even if it were so, he
said, "we should have made very little way toward the founding of a scientific code" because
we don't know what rules or procedures would be appropriate. See id. at 289.
95. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 82, at I-I, Q. 96, a. 3.
96. See id. at I-I1, Q. 92, a. 1.
97. See Alschuler, supra note 76, at 376-78.
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the lawmakers might have a greater degree of prudence and hence a
better idea of how one should act.9" Second, even though different rules
can be equally prudent, sometimes we all must follow the same rule in
order to coordinate our actions. Law can specify a rule.99 Alschuler
suggests that even Mother Teresa might not stop at an intersection if the
authorities had posted no stop sign there."° Aquinas' two reasons
explain why she would stop if they had. Those who posted the sign
might better understand the danger of the intersection, and the sign
coordinates her driving with that of others who will expect her to stop.
If obedience to a good law helps a good person toward his end, so
obedience to a bad law can thwart it. Aquinas therefore agreed with
Alschuler that sometimes, a person should disobey."'1 In that sense, he
would have agreed with Alschuler's inversion of Holmes' definition of
law: it "consists of those societal settlements that a good person should
regard as authoritative."'" He also would have agreed that there is no
neat formula to tell one when to disobey, and that the decision can be
difficult. It requires prudence.
The natural lawyers also would have agreed that the boundaries the
law sets to what people can do are based on a kind of reciprocity. Their
conception of reciprocity, however, differed from that of Alschuler. In
Alschuler's account, some people-saints-want nothing for themselves;
others-bad men-want whatever they can get; and most of us are
somewhere in the middle. 3 We will stay within the bounds the law
sets, but we want to be assured that others are doing so as well. In
contrast, in the Aristotelian account, those who want to lead a good life
want what is truly best for themselves. Those who do not will hurt
themselves. Part of living a genuinely human life is to help others to
live one as well. Those who do not help others deprive themselves of
that part which is intrinsically more valuable than an arm, let alone a
new car. One can test the intuitive force of this proposition by asking
which of two people one would choose to be: a vindictive or grasping
person with both arms intact and a new car to drive, or someone who
is kind and generous but carless and incapacitated.

98.
99.
100.
101.

SUMMA TH-OLOGIAE, supra note 82, at I-II, Q. 95, a. 1, ad 2; id. at Q. 95, a. 2.
See id. at I-I, Q. 95, a. 2.
Alschuler, supra note 76, at 377.
See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 82, at I-I, Q. 96, a. 4; Alschuler, supranote 76,

at 395.
102. See Alschuler, supra note 76, at 393. Aquinas' definition was that law is "a rule of
reason for the common good made by him who has care of the community and promulgated."
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 82, at I-II, Q. 90, a. 4.
103. See Alschuler, supra note 76, at 378.
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Aristotle and Aquinas recognized that people also need material
resources to live a genuinely human life. Thus they spoke of distributive
justice. For them, however, distributive justice was not a compact in
which each person keeps his greed from overstepping certain bounds in
return for a like promise by others. It was an attempt, insofar as
possible, to give each person what he needs to live the sort of life he
should.
They also spoke of commutative or corrective justice, which
preserves the resources that belong to each citizen. Elsewhere, I have
described how, beginning in the 16th century, the first systematic theory
of contract and tort law was built by using the Aristotelian idea of
commutative justice as a starting point for thinking about Roman
law." Many of their conclusions were adopted by Hugo Grotius and
spread throughout Europe even by jurists who had rejected Aristotle and
accepted rationalism, possibly because they did not yet see its full
implications.
While the natural lawyers were clear about their assumptions,
Holmes was not. Modem scholars have wondered where Holmes
supposed that the purposes the law serves actually come from. As Jan
Vetter observed, the question was critical and Holmes gave no satisfactory answer. "In the face of widespread if not general agreement that
legal reasoning should, and could be supported in some way, he slipped
into irrelevance on the subject."' 5 As Thomas Grey says, "Holmes'
predicament, then, was to be an instrumentalist without an adequate
system of ends." 1"
Holmes said that the law serves "social end[s] which the governing
power of the community has made up its mind that it wants. ' ' "WThat
isn't very informative. It would be surprising if the law served ends that
the governing power had decided it did not want. Moreover, if the law
is to be extracted from the decided cases, then the ends of the "governing power" include those "inarticulate[ly] and unconscious[ly]"'"
expressed in hundreds of thousands of judicial decisions. Also, Holmes
seemed to count any end he could find in the case law as "social" just
because it was there. For example, he traced the rules governing
possession back to an instinct by which a "thing which you have
enjoyed and used as your own for a long time ...takes root in your

104. See GORDLEY, supra note 35, at 69-111.
105. Jan Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 343,
348-49 (1984).
106. Grey, supra note 67, at 850.
107. Law in Science and Science in Law, supra note 72, at 225.
108. Holmes, supra note 3, at 466.
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being and cannot be tom away without your resenting the act and trying
to defend yourself."'"'° A social end could be rather unsocial. Why,
however, are some ends to be pursued rather than others?
Holmes sometimes sounded as if he thought that it does not matter
which ends are pursued as long as the governing power wants them. He
who has power has his own ends reflected in the law whatever they may
be. Thrasymachus told Socrates that justice is the right of the stronger.
Grant Gilmore thought that Holmes agreed. He quotes The Common
Law: "The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should
correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community,
whether right or wrong."... Some scholars such as Jan Vetter and
Robert Gordon think that Holmes spoke this way because he bought into
Social Darwinism."' They quote a passage from an unsigned essay he
wrote in 1873 essay on "The Gas-Stoker's Strike":
The struggle for life ... does not stop in the ascending
scale with the monkeys, but is equally the law of human
existence.... The more powerful interests must be more or
less reflected in legislation; which, like every other device
of man or beast, must
tend in the long run to aid the
2
survival of the fittest.1
But granted that Holmes thought that law serves the purposes of the
dominant group, it doesn't follow that he thought that law was merely
a tool to keep this group in power. In The Common Law, the law is
usually protecting people in general against, for example, criminals or
the hasty and awkward. As Vetter notes, the "supreme power" whose
desires the law reflected seems to be merely "the ordinary prudent and
intelligent person."".3 Though he lived in a period of intense class
struggle, Holmes thought capitalism benefitted workers. The amount that
capitalists consumed was a small price to pay for interesting them in the
efficient management of their enterprises."' Moreover, granted that
Holmes thought the law responds to "the actual feelings and demands
109. Id. at 477.

110. GILMORE, supra note 47, at 49.
111. See Vetter, supra note 105, at 362-67; Gordon, supra note 8, at 740; J.W. Burrow,
Holmes in His IntellectualMilieu, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 17,28-29
(Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992).
112. See Vetter, supra note 105, at 365; Gordon, supra note 8, at 739-40 (quoting Oliver
W. Holmes, Jr., Summary of Events: The Gas-Stoker's Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 582, 583 (1873)
(unsigned essay, reprintedat 44 HARV. L. REV. 795 (1931)).

113. Vetter, supra note 105, at 366.
114. See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Economic Elements, in COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS 279,
279-80 (1920).
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of the community right or wrong," it doesn't follow that Holmes thought
right and wrong merely meant the feelings or demands of the community. The "final and most important question in the law," he said, is
whether the ideals and beliefs upon which it is based have "worth in a
more far-reaching sense than that of expressing the de facto will of the
community for the time."" 5 If Holmes had really thought that the law
was merely the instrument of greed, or of beliefs and ideals ultimately
incompatible with his own, he would not have described law as one of
the "vastest products of the human mind.1 . 6 Nor would he have
devoted his life to it.
Some scholars think he was a utilitarian. They note correctly that
Holmes was concerned with policy and with the effects of rules on
society. They then leap too readily to the conclusion that he conceived
of these effects as a utilitarian would." 7 Once, Holmes said that the
worth of an end depended upon the "intensity" of the "desires" for it
which vary "with the varying ideals of the time. '' . He thought that
we "only occasionally can reach an absolutely final and quantitative
determination" of the worth of an end." 9 But that doesn't mean he
thought an end was worthwhile only because it satisfied people's
desires. Moreover, he rejected the idea that the law should serve the
greatest good of the greatest number, whether arrived at by a utilitarian
calculus of the intensity of individual desires, or in any other way.
"Why should the greatest number be preferred? Why not the greatest
good of the most intelligent and most highly developed? The greatest
good of a minority of our generation may be the greatest good of the
greatest number in the long run."'" I can imagine him making similar
remarks if Richard Posner were to tell him that the law is supposed to
maximize the satisfaction of individual preferences backed by cash.
Some scholars such as Thomas Grey have thought that Holmes was
a pragmatist in the philosophical sense of the term. It is true that, in his
youth, Holmes belonged to the Metaphysical Club along with such
115. Holdworth'sEnglish Law, supra note 94, at 288.
116. Holmes, supra note 3, at 473.
117. H.L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE

12 (1984); Patrick J. Kelley, Oliver Wendell Holmes, UtilitarianJurisprudence,and Positivism
of John StuartMill, 30 AM. J. OF JURISPRUDENCE 189, 205 (1985); Patrick J. Kelley, A Critical
Analysis of Holmes's Theory of Torts, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 681, 704 (1983). Similarly, to prove
Holmes was a utilitarian, Kelley shows that Holmes held other beliefs shared by utilitarians and
non-utilitarians alike: for example, that the law gives people incentives to avoid certain actions,
and that people should be able to know what the law is, which Kelley calls "essential utilitarian
commitments." Kelley, UtilitarianJurisprudence,supra, at 208.
118. Law in Science and Science in Law, supra note 72, at 231.
119. Id.
120. Holmes, supra note 112, at 584.
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founders of American Pragmatism as William James and Charles Pierce,
and that in his old age, he read Dewey's book, Experience and Nature,
and said that its "view of the universe came home to me closer than any
other that I know."' Grey claims that Holmes, like the pragmatists,
pulled together two ideas: that law is contextual, "rooted in custom and
shared expectations," and that it is a means for achieving social
ends."
As we have seen, however, for Holmes, an end seems to have
counted as "social" simply because the law pursued it. Moreover, the
fact that Holmes thought that rules could be extracted from case law
does not mean that he had a pragmatist theory of knowledge. If it did,
all American jurists today would be pragmatists in the philosophical
sense. So would many Europeans. Moreover, Holmes called William
James' philosophy "humbug."'" He said of James (and Bergson): "I
certainly can't bring my mind to believe that either of them has
advanced speculation very much except perhaps as an extreme protest
against Hegel's attempt to make a syllogism wag its tail, or, more
plainly, to get life out of logic chopping."'24 And, indeed, his vision
of theory was not that of a pragmatist. As we have seen, he praised the
"exalted life" of "a great abstract thinker" who works "simply to feed
the deepest hunger and to use the greatest gifts of his soul."'" He
called for "the broadest generalizations" and for "more theory."'" 6 That
doesn't sit well with Grey's characterization of a pragmatist. As Grey
notes: "The payoff of pragmatist philosophy is ... more often in the
critique than in the construction."' 27 "Pragmatism rejects the maxim
that you can only beat a theory with a better theory."'" The helpful
theories will not be "elegant" but "messy, complex, and unlovely."' 29
It is hard to imagine Holmes' thinking that such a theory fed the deepest
hunger of his soul.
We have to remember that Holmes was a jurist and not a philosopher. He spent his life solving legal problems, and he did so from the

121. Letter of July 26, 1930, in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 272 (Mark D. Howe ed.,
1941).
122. Grey, supra note 67, at 805.
123. Letter of June 17, 1908, in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 121, at 139.
Grey has collected a number of such passages. Grey, supra note 67, at 866-88.
124. Letter of April 16, 1913, in HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 87, at
63 (adding "this without prejudice to W. James's psychology").
125. Law in Science and Science in Law, supra note 72, at 224.
126. See supra notes 26 & 28 and accompanying text.
127. Grey, supra note 67, at 814.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 815.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 3
[Vol. 49

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

ground up, mining the case law for hints of what might be important,
rather than starting with an idea of what was ultimately important and
working downward. That doesn't make him a pragmatist. But it means
that as long as he found the ideals of the law in rough correspondence
with his own, he could do his job without answering questions about
what was ultimately important.
Was he skeptical about whether anything was ultimately important?
As we have seen, he thought that "the final and most important question
in the law" was whether the beliefs and ideals on which the law rests
have "worth in a more far-reaching sense than that of expressing the de
facto will of the community for the time."'' Yet he said, "When I say
that a thing is true, I mean that I cannot help believing it .... I
therefore define the truth as the system of my limitations. ... "131 He
made the same statement when asked by his friend Canon Patrick
Sheehan whether he believed in "objective truth."' 3' He made a similar
statement to his friend Sir Frederick Pollock to explain why he
disagreed with William James.133 It sounds as though he is saying: "I
believe what I believe with conviction and passion, but I am uncertain
whether anything I believe is really true."
It is a short step from there to mysticism. This unfathomable
universe has somehow conjured up people who must and should believe
in ideals, and yet, of the universe itself and of the truth of their beliefs
nothing can be said. I think Holmes did believe something like that. It
is what he seems to be saying in his essay Natural Law and elsewhere.M I think it explains the last words of The Path of the Law:
130. Holdworth's English Law, supra note 94, at 288.
131. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Ideals and Doubts, in COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS 303, 304-05

(1920).
132. See Letter of August 14, 1911, in HOLMES-SHEEHAN
87, at 42-44.
133. Letter of June 17, 1908, supra note 123, at 139.
134. For example:

CORRESPONDENCE,

supra note

Now when we come to our attitude toward the universe I do not see any rational
ground for demanding the superlative--for being dissatisfied unless we are assured
that our truth is cosmic truth, if there is such a thing-that the ultimates of a little
creature on this little earth are the last word of the unimaginable whole.
Natural Law, supra note 37, at 314-15. "[Tihe part can not swallow the whole.., our
categories are not, or may not be, adequate to formulate what we cannot know." Id. at 315.
Similarly, he wrote to Sheehan: "I look at a man as a cosmic [insignificance], having neither
merit nor demerit except from a human and social point of view, working to some unknown end
or no end, outside himself and having sufficient reasons, easily stated, for doing his best." Letter
of April 1, 1911, in HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 87, at 41. And similarly:
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An intellect great enough to win the prize needs other food
besides success. The remoter and more general aspects of
the law are those which give it universal interest. It is
through them that you not only become a great master in
your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and
catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable
process, a hint of the universal law.2
If Holmes had believed that the human mind could grasp this universal
law and its connection to human law, he would have been a natural
lawyer. Instead, his universal law seems to have been "infinite,"
"unfathomable," something of which we can say nothing definite but
of
which we catch glimpses, hints, and echoes in the law we study. As
Burrow observed, these words remind one of Holmes' description,
written years before, of his thoughts as he lay wounded after the Battle
of Ball's Bluff thinking he might die."36 He wondered whether his soul
Idon't even speak of purposes or designs which for all I know are inadequate to
the foundation of all, but I am content to believe that probably I do not see the
ultimate significance of things (to speak in human terms) and to crack at it, without
inquiring too curiously what if any that ultimate significance may be.
Id. at 50 (Letter of Oct. 18, 1912).
I do not know whether our ultimates such as good and bad, ideals, for the matter
of that, consciousness, are cosmic ultimates or not. They seem to me to bear marks
of the human and the finite. All that I know is that they are ultimates for us.
Letter to Dr. John Wu, July 26, 1923, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., SOME UNPUBLISHED
LETrERS OF JusTicE HOLMES 263 (Reprinted from the T'ien Hsia Monthly 1935).
135. Holmes, supra note 3, at 478.
136. See Burrow, supra note 11, at 24. Burrow also speaks of Holmes' "mysticism." See
id. He also notes the resemblance to Emerson. See id. (quoting Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 853 (1989)). They seem to share a "conception of
a wisdom in nature's evolutionary processes, even when they appear to be most ruthless in
eliminating the unfit." Id. A personal acquaintance with Emerson made a strong impression on
Holmes when he was young. See MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE
NATURAL LAW 31-36 (1992). A few years before his death, spoke of him as "the only firebrand
of my youth that bums to me as brightly as ever...." Letter of May 20, 1930, in 2 HOLMESPOLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 121, at 264. And Emerson sometimes spoke of his "Over-Soul"
as "the Highest Law" or "absolute law." The Over-Soul, in I THE WORKS OF RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 171, 182 (Tudor Pub. Co, N.Y.). But there the resemblance ends. Emerson thought
he was enlightened by the Over-Soul. See id at 181 ("For this communication is an influx of
the Divine mind into our mind."). He thought that many people were similarly enlightened and
were therefore in some sense right whatever the contradictions in what they said. Id. (The OverSoul was there in "[t]he trances of Socrates, the "union" of Plotinus, the vision of Porphyry, the
conversion of Paul, the aurora of Behmen, the convulsions of George Fox and his Quakers, the
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was in jeopardy because he did not believe in God. He decided that a
last minute conversion would be an act of cowardice and that, in any
case, he was incapable of one.
Then came in my Philosophy-I am to take a leap in the
dark-but now as ever I believe that whatever shall happen
is best-for it is in accordance with a general law-and
good & universal (or general law) are synonymous terms
in the universe-(I can now add that our phrase good only
means certain general truths seen through the heart & will
instead of being merely contemplated intellectually-I
doubt if the intellect accepts or recognizes that classification
of good and bad).'37
If he died, Holmes thought, his death was for the best because it was in
accord with an unfathomable general law. If the unfathomable could do
that, then the unfathomable could make the life of an "abstract thinker"
to be the "deepest hunger of his soul" and yet set him to discover truths
that were merely self-limitations and to think thoughts that, at best, were
echoes of the ultimately real and utterly unknowable. He must have felt
like a soldier who can see his own mission but has no idea why it has
been assigned him or how it is related to the larger course of the war or
even what the war is all about.' And, indeed, in his Memorial Day
speech of 1895, he said:
But who of us could endure a world ...without the divine
folly of honor, without the senseless passion for knowledge
outreaching the flaming bounds of the possible, without
illuminations of Swedenborg .... ) Consequently, he was less worried about the ultimate truth
of what he believed. See id. at 180 ("We know truth when we see it, let sceptic and scoffer say
what they choose.") Holmes mysticism was of a different sort. Holmes did not think that the
universe or universal law enlightened him. If he could, finally, hear an echo, it was because of
hard application of his natural faculties. Despite the problems that I think he had with the law
of non-contradiction, he still regarded his conclusions, at least in human terms, as bets which
he might lose. If his horse lost, he would not have told his bookie that in some transcendental
sense, all the horses had really won. And his belief that the ultimate was truly unknowable
worried him.
137. Holmes' Diary, supra note 1, at 28.
138. He uses that metaphor in his essay on "Natural Law":
That the universe has in it more than we understand, that the private soldiers have
not been told the plan of campaign, or even that there is one, rather than some
vaster unthinkable to which every predicate is an impertinence, has no bearing
upon our conduct. We still shall fight ....
Natural Law, supra note 37, at 315-16.
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ideals the essence of which is that they never can be
achieved. I do not know what is true. I do not know the
meaning of the universe. But... there is one thing that I
do not doubt... and that is that the faith is true and
adorable that leads a soldier to throw away his life in
obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he
little understands, in a plan of campaign of which he has no
notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use.'39
That statement has made some people wonder if Holmes was a mature
and self-directed individual."4 I can't think why. It is just the way a
person would see his situation if he thought the point of his life was to
pursue goodness and truth in a world in which whatever is ultimately
good or true is unknowable.
My objection is that Holmes is violating the most universal law that
governs human thought: the law of non-contradiction. Suppose our
beliefs contradict. Suppose that neither of us can help believing as we
do. If truth is whatever we cannot help believing, then I must acknowledge that your belief is true even though I believe it to be false. Or
suppose I could not help believing one thing yesterday, but now, after
rethinking the matter or finding some new evidence, I cannot help
believing something different. If truth is whatever I cannot help
believing, then both beliefs are true. How curious that I changed my
mind.
If Holmes had agreed with me on that point, he might have asked
himself whether the purposes the law serves are genuinely worthwhile.
He couldn't answer that they are worthwhile although no one can know
whether they really are, or that they are although worthwhile means only
Holmes' idea of the worthwhile. If he answered yes, some purposes
really are worthwhile, then presumably he would have agreed that
although human beings can be mistaken, they have an ability to see
what these purposes are. Those, as we have seen, were the assumptions
of the classical natural lawyers. And as we have seen, on those
assumptions, Holmes' program makes sense, but his view of the
relationship of law and morality does not. Alschuler is right. It does not
make sense to look at the law as a bad man would. We should look at
it like good people who respect the law if and to the extent that the
purposes it serves are good.
But we can ask a similar question of Alschuler. Is a good person
genuinely good? If we hold Alschuler to the same rules as Holmes, he
139. Oliver W. Holmes, The Soldier's Faith, in SPEECHES BY OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
56, 59 (Boston, 1913).
140. Reimann, supra note 38, at 75 n.ll.
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cannot answer that a good person is good although ultimately he may
not be any better than anyone else, or that good means only Alschuler's
idea of the good.
If he answered no, a good person is not really good, then it is hard
to see why he defines law as the societal settlements that a good person
should regard as authoritative. If he answered yes, then he might take
us within hailing distance of the classical natural lawyers. If we agree
with him, we may find it hard to think about a good person without
thinking about a good life and what contributes to it. That is close to
speaking of an end to human life to which one's activities should
contribute. We might then think that we have some ability, other than
a capacity for deductive logic, to see what a good life entails. For want
of a better word, we might call that ability "prudence." At any rate, we
will have entered a different intellectual world, one in which "Shall we
discuss the nature of virtue?" is an invitation to a dialogue rather than
a conversation stopper.
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